In a proper EMV solution, hardware like this can not intercept the PIN code even if it can interpret any signal, as the unencrypted PIN is not sent anywhere beyond the keypad - even if you do MITM on the wires between the keypad and POS terminal, you would get only an encrypted version that then gets sent to the bank for online verification or to the chip for offline verification. You can get the PIN code by cameras or extra keypad on top of the real keypad, as sometimes is done for ATM skimming.
Furthermore, they can't get the card private keys in this manner, so they can't duplicate the card chip, only its magstripe; and they are definitely able to tell if a replica of your card is suddenly used in a magstripe-only mode. This means that it's a problem, as the parent post said, "only for countries like USA which have not completed the move from magnetic readers" because otherwise you can simply reject any transactions that might use a cloned magstripe.
Defcon 24 vid about skimming EMV cards at ATMs and withdrawing cash from the skimmed account at a different remote ATM (cashout): https://m.youtube.com/watch?v=FgIk_oIK2SM
That being said, this doesn't allow to duplicate a card (it relays the fraudulent transaction in real time to the real card while it's stuck into compromised hardware), the PIN is captured from video or the "la-cara"device, and you do need to have the "extracting" device mounted to a real ATM for prolonged periods until you can empty it (you can do it only as fast as the real transactions come in, and they do so at unpredictable intervals), which gives a nice opportunity to capture the involved people. It's a very powerful proof of concept, but harder to scale than the current "cashout crews"/mules - the logistic problems are somewhat comparable to the classic approach of setting up a completely fake ATM.
Furthermore, they can't get the card private keys in this manner, so they can't duplicate the card chip, only its magstripe; and they are definitely able to tell if a replica of your card is suddenly used in a magstripe-only mode. This means that it's a problem, as the parent post said, "only for countries like USA which have not completed the move from magnetic readers" because otherwise you can simply reject any transactions that might use a cloned magstripe.