The alerts icon (triangle with a ! in it) shows a text list of the outages. There are many active; only one happened recently. They seem spaced out from each other, not indicative of a burst of Chinese naval activity.
It is not a burst but a consistent sabotage action happening in the background [1]. To make the matter worse, those vessels that commit the crime will be merchant ship flying flags of convenience. [2]
We don’t use the word reasonable anymore the way it was written originally, and the actual meaning is what you’re asking for, except for every conviction, not just capital ones. It doesn’t mean “a small but tolerable level of doubt”. It means doubt backed by reason. “Aliens made me do it” is doubt that is not backed by reason. “There is another plausible way that conforms to the evidence given that he came to possess that laptop” is reasonable doubt.
Docker runs an ARM kernel and uses qemu in user mode on the individual binary level. Anything CPU-bound is emulated, but as soon as you do a system call, you’re back in native land, so I/O bound stuff should run decently.
That seems to be the spot humans are weakest at—reviewing something where we think the computer did a good job 90% of the time, but quickly noticing when something goes wrong. Similar to level 3 self-driving—requiring full attention, able to instantly snap into full unassisted driving.
Trusting a bunch of people seems a lot better than trusting a single person. For instance, in this case, the two sane pilots were able to restrain the third and prevent a disaster.
This is just completely untenable in reality, you're going to have multiple people jump in during an emergency (how do they know? will they be monitoring every flight at all times?) and potentially rip the controls away from PIC because they, by committee, decided on the spot that they could do a better job?
My wife has had kids in all these settings, except the home birth was through the same provider as the birthing center. All of them were covered by insurance, except the birthing center is out of network. There’s an in-network one the next city over.
(This is a perfectly ordinary HDHP/HSA plan through a large company that you’ve heard of.)
I’m assuming you are proposing to stat each candidate before trying to execve it. I’m also assuming that a stat system call is roughly as expensive as an execve of a nonexistent or non-executable path.
For every failed candidate, you are doing one system call, so roughly the same cost each way.
Now if you just do an execve, you’re just paying that cost. If you stat first, you pay the cost of another system call that doesn’t change the flow of your program at all (a nice way of saying you’re wasting time).
Unless stat is dramatically faster than exec on a nonexistent or non-executable path, there’s never a case where this is better.
Context switches could straightforwardly be saved by doing the PATH splitting and lookup in-kernel, or just providing a list of executable paths to check.
It didn't work out this way historically (doing unnecessary string processing, requiring extra memory, could've been more expensive than the context switches), and the performance impact of failed execve isn't normally a high priority, and there are other reasons not to want stuff in the kernel (not that it stops frankly less critical stuff from getting in the kernel), but there's definitely low-hanging fruit here if it like, mattered.
The US is large enough to have had its government break promises like this time and again. That’s why you’ll see a lot of people on here that will object to a design requiring you to trust the owners of your infrastructure.
Signal is the chief example of this kind of design. All they can provide a government is the creation date of someone’s account, and the last time they tried to check for messages. Neither message content nor metadata (who sent messages to whom) is accessible, assuming the app follows the design and the design doesn’t have defects.
